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MISREGULATING TELEVISION: NETWORK DOMINANCE AND THE 
FCC. By Stanley M. Besen, Thomas G. Krattenmaker, A. Richard 
Metzger, Jr., and John R. Woodbury. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 1984. Pp. viii, 202. Cloth, $24; paper $9.95. 
Television is a major force in modem American society. Bridging 
both time and distance, it brings realistic representations of far away 
events into the average American's living room. Even more impor-
tant, the commentary, sets, and special effects used in television pro-
grams can have a dramatic sensory impact on the viewer, arousing 
emotions and instilling opinions about the world around him and even 
about himself. Recognizing this influence, many commentators have 
expressed dissatisfaction with the programs broadcast into American 
homes. They criticize television programs as boring, repetitious, and 
expressive of negative cultural stereotypes. One writer has simply la-
beled television a "vast wasteland." 1 
Congress certainly underestimated the impact that the broadcast 
media would have on American culture when, in 1934, it established -
the Federal Communications Commission.2 Initially, the Commis-
sion's main purpose was to control the distribution of the available 
radio frequency spectrum among users. As time passed, the impor-
tance of the broadcast media as a source of entertainment and infor-
mation grew. Along with this growth came heightened awareness that 
FCC regulation pervasively influences the shape of the broadcast 
industry.3 
1. N. MINOW, EQUAL TIME 52 (1964). 
2. Just a few years earlier, in 1912, a naval officer testified before a House committee: "[T]he 
department believes that wireless communication should be limited as far as possible, to its legiti-
mate field; that is, communication between the shore and vessels at sea." E. DOERING, FED-
ERAL CONTROL OF BROADCASTING VERSUS FREEDOM OF THE AIR 4 (1939) (reflecting the 
government's underestimation of the potential impact of radio) (emphasis in original). 
3. By the late 1930s one commentator said, writing about radio: 
Art thrives upon competition and spontaneity o[ ldeas. One cannot regulate mediocrity out 
of existence. At best one can supplant one medipcrity with another .... All that regulatory 
authority can do to assist radio as an art is (1) to safeguard the public with regard to free-
dom of speech, and from indecent and obscene language and material, and (2) to maintain 
the competitive vitality of broadcasting as a whole so that the best possible program service 
will result. 
Id. at 39 (quoting Hettinger, The Economic Factor in Radio Regulation, 9 AIR L. REV. 115, 126 
(1938)). 
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In Misregulating Television, Stanley M. Besen,4 Thomas G. Krat-
tenmaker,5 A. Richard Metzger, Jr.,6 and John R. Woodbury7 attempt 
to explain why the FCC's regulatory policies led to the development 
and continued existence of only three national television networks, 
which together control eighty percent of the prime time viewing audi-
ence and ninety percent of total television industry revenues (p. 4). 
The authors' thesis, which they finally admit in chapter three, 8 is not 
that large, national networks are bad, but rather that there are too few 
such networks. Under the heading "Basic Principles," the authors 
write: 
[T]here is no reason to value, for its own sake, a reduction in television 
network size. As explained [in Chapter Two], networking is an efficient 
method of supplying television programs to viewers and the simple fact 
that networks "dominate" the industry . . . is neither surprising nor 
threatening. The number of networks and the relationships among them 
may substantially affect the Commission's economic and social policy 
goals, but the fact of networking does not. [pp. 23-24] 
The authors derive this thesis from the premise that large networks are 
the most cost effective means of providing television programming 
(pp. 6-7). 
By equating social desirability with economic efficiency, the au-
thors take a gigantic intellectual leap over the social influence inherent 
in television. This thesis is convenient, though, because it leads di-
rectly to the authors' conclusion - that almost all television regula-
tion should be abolished. Misregulating Television is really just a 
rationalization for television deregulation. 
4. Stanley M. Besen is a senior economist at the Rand Corporation and was formerly codi-
rector of the FCC Network Inquiry. The FCC initiated the Network Inquiry to investigate the 
desirability and feasibility of adopting more rules regulating network conduct, many of which 
had been suggested by the Justice Department's antitrust proceedings against ABC, CBS, and 
NBC. In those proceedings, initiated in 1972, the Justice Department had alleged that the three 
major networks had monopolized the business of exhibiting prime time television programs. Pp. 
1-2. 
Although all of the authors were members of the FCC Network Inquiry, much of the re-
search for this book took place after the Inquiry had concluded. The authors do not represent 
this book to be the findings or conclusions of the Inquiry. P. 2. 
5. Thomas G. K.rattenmaker is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University and was for-
merly codirector of the FCC Network Inquiry. See also note 4 supra. 
6. A. Richard Metzger, Jr. is a member of the Washington, D.C., law firm of Wald, Hark· 
rader, and Ross. He was principal counsel to the FCC Network Inquiry. See also note 4 supra. 
7. John R. Woodbury is vice president of research and policy analysis for the National Cable 
Television Association and was senior staff economist for the FCC Network Inquiry. See also 
note 4 supra. 
8. The authors hint at their economic approach in their introduction: 
Simply put, our goal is to employ the tools of legal and economic analysis to consider 
what functions the commercial practices of television networks serve, whether those prac-
tices undermine the goals of the Communications Act or national antitrust policy, and how 
regulation of these practices might affect the industry's performance in an expanded 
marketplace. 
P. 3. 
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The authors begin their analysis of television regulation by explain-
ing how the FCC's spectrum management policies made the develop-
ment and continued existence of only three national networks 
inevitable. The authors argue that the FCC initially allocated too 
small a range of the available broadcasting frequencies to television. 
Then, the Commission tried to locate at least one broadcast facility in 
each U.S. community. Different frequencies had to be allocated to 
communities in close proximity to one another to avoid interference 
between the broadcast signals. As a result, each community received 
only a few broadcast frequencies. The authors contend that only three 
high quality television transmissions can reach 100% of U.S. television 
households (pp. 14-15). 
Networks can compete equally only if they can reach audiences of 
equal size (pp. 5-9). The authors contend that, using all available fre-
quencies, a fourth network would reach only 91.3% of U.S. television 
households, a fifth 81.1 %, and a sixth only 66.8% (p. 15). Thus, addi-
tional networks would be handicapped by smaller audiences over 
which to spread their operating costs.9 
Limiting their analysis to economic terms and assuming that in-
creasing the number of national networks will produce the most desir-
able television programming (pp. 24-26), the authors conclude that the 
FCC spectrum management policies are complete failures (pp. 168-
69). Unfortunately, the authors never explain what goals the FCC at-
tempted to meet with these policies. (pp. 14, 27-28). There must be 
some explanation for the Commission's desire to have a television 
transmitter in each community, whether it was political pressure or an 
incorrect evaluation of the nature of the television industry.10 The au-
thors' arguments appear logically correct but seem suspect because 
only one side is presented. 
Next, the authors devote Chapter .Three to the development of cri-
teria with which to judge the effectiveness of FCC television regula-
tion. This chapter is unconvincing. The authors conclude that the 
regulatory scheme should "further the values of competition, diver-
sity, and localism" (p. 23). According to the authors, these "values" 
roughly correspond to the "widely agreed upon" (p. 21) "fundamental 
goals [of broadcast regulation] - economic efficiency, an economic 
environment conducive to the enjoyment of First Amendment free-
doms, and the observance of the policies established by the Communi-
cations Act" (p. 29). Goals other than economic efficiency, however, 
9. The authors do assert that a fourth network could be profitable, but that the FCC erected 
barriers to entry that blocked efforts to create additional networks. Pp. 8-9. Many of these 
barriers have been removed. See infra. 
10. The authors "confess [their] inability to understand" the Commission's concern over lo-
calism. See pp. 27-29. 
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become empty words in the mouths of the authors. They betray their 
bias openly, writing: 
An argument can be made that competition is the single criterion by 
which FCC regulations of network behavior should be measured. Cer-
tainly most economic policies that might be advocated are protected by 
competition. Further, insofar as the economic regulation of nonbroad-
, cast media in this country can be said to rest on a coherent principle, 
that principle seems to be reliance on competition . . . . 
Nevertheless, diversity and localism are frequently suggested as addi-
tional or alternative criteria by which FCC economic regulations should 
be judged. This apparent paradox may be resolved, we think, by consid-
ering, in light of what has been said, precisely what those terms might 
signify. Properly understood, each can describe an additional, appropri-
ate criterion by which to assess the Commission's performance. 11 
The authors then define and discuss diversity and localism in strictly 
economic terms, 12 without recognizing the limitations of their eco-
nomic analysis. The authors attempt to trivialize criteria that do not 
fit comfortably within their economic model. Recognizing the incon-
sistencies that remain between their criteria and their model, the au-
thors concede: "Candor and completeness in judging these issues ... 
requires that we confess our inability to understand what positive val-
ues the 'community localism' criterion reflects" (p. 28). This inability 
to recognize noneconomic values characterizes the authors' approach 
to the entire subject of television regulation. 
Moreover, the authors fail to establish a logical connection be-
tween their premises and their conclusions. For example, the authors 
do not explain why the community localism criterion supports their 
conclusion that more national networks are needed. Additional na-
tional networks would certainly find it just as difficult as current net-
works to produce shows of local importance. In addition, the authors 
never apply these criteria to the examination of the FCC spectrum-
management policies that preceded this chapter. Taken as a whole, 
Misregulating Television's treatment of these criteria creates the im-
pression that the authors only included this discussion to imply that 
their conclusions were the result of objective, multivalued analysis. 
The remaining chapters of Misregulating Television are devoted to 
economic analyses of (1) the network-affiliate relationship, (2) the net-
11. Pp. 25-26 (emphasis added). Although the authors assert that competition "achieves 
many ends that are conducive to realizing First Amendment values," p. 25, it seems evident that 
the primary goal they seek to advance through competition is economic. They state, "[u]ndcr 
competitive conditions, the number, quality, content, and cost of programs arc determined by 
impersonal marketplace forces ...• " P. 25. 
12. The authors define "diversity" as "[t]he term ... used to describe the goal of increasing 
the number and types of programs produced by different suppliers and broadcast to viewers by 
different firms." P. 26. They define "localism" as "(p]ermit[ting] more viewers (or more sta-
tions) to make more individual choices regarding what is broadcast," and "the broadcast of 
programs of limited geographic scope or interest." P. 28. They quickly dismiss the second ver-
sion of localism, eliminating the only noneconomic rationale. See text following this note. 
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work - program supplier relationship, and (3) network ownership of 
local stations. These analyses are in part based on a previous article 
co-written by Misregulating Television coauthor Besen.13 
Besen's previous article examined the relationship between net-
works and affiliates and the economic impact of FCC regulation on 
that relationship. One of the article's tangential observations was that 
"some of the benefits generated by the formation of a network accrue 
not to the network but to its affiliated stations. This fact may partly 
explain why a fourth network is not formed." 14 This objective obser-
vation in Besen's previous work is seized upon by the authors of Mis-
regulating Television as potent ammunition in their battle against 
wasteful regulation. Because Misregulating Television assumes that 
the formation of new national networks should be encouraged, the 
transfer of wealth from networks to affiliates is undesirable. The au-
thors also attack almost all FCC television regulation as strengthening 
affiliates or program suppliers at the expense of large, national 
networks. 
Unfortunately, as with their discussion of the FCC spectrum-man-
agement policies, the authors never admit that any arguments exist 
contrary to their own. Nor do they admit that the FCC might have 
established these policies for rational reasons. The Commission could 
have originally envisioned television networks like PBS, which nation-
ally broadcasts programs produced by local affiliates. Perhaps the 
FCC just wanted to give local affiliates and program suppliers some 
bargaining power against powerful national networks. That bargain-
ing power could in turn further the authors' supposed goals of diver-
sity and community localism. However, the reader must discover 
elsewhere arguments that counter the opinions expressed in Misregu-
lating Television. 
The greatest problem with this book is that it does not address the 
television industry as it currently exists. The authors recognize that 
the FCC has eliminated many of the entry barriers that it had imposed 
on pay and cable television. Their own statistics show that the 
number of subscribers to pay cable service has risen from 650,000 
households in 1976 to 17.9 million households in 1983 (p. 12). There 
are more television programs available as a result of this boom in the 
number of cable subscribers. 
Many of the questions that really need to be answered at this point 
in television's development concern the growth of cable television. 
Can it reach enough homes to circumvent the limitations imposed by 
13. Compare Besen & Soligo, The Economics of the Network-Affiliate Relationship in the Tel-
evision Broadcasting Industry, 63 AM. EcoN. REv. 259 (1973) (formulating a model of the net-
work-affiliate relationship in order to evaluate FCC objectives and relationships), with pp. 50-66 
(explaining various economic details of the network-affiliate relationship). 
14. Besen & Soligo, supra note 13, at 267. 
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the FCC's spectrum-management policies? Can it even reach enough 
homes to sustain its own existence? Can and should the FCC promul-
gate rules to help the cable industry? What is the future of "supersta-
tions," local stations which, via satellite, transmit their programming 
to cable systems nationwide? Can any of the special interest cable net-
works or the superstations evolve into nationally competitive net-
works? The questions continue, but the authors of Misregulating 
Television propose no original answers. 
As a basis for recommendation of future FCC regulation, Misregu-
lating Television is inadequate because the authors fail to address cur-
rent issues. As a history of television regulation, the book is flawed by 
the authors' refusal to present balanced arguments. One redeeming 
quality of this work is that it explains the views of four participants in 
the most recent FCC Network Inquiry. Nevertheless, students of tele-
vision regulation should also read some of the other works in this 
field. 15 They should approach the conclusions of Misregulating Televi-
sion's authors with skepticism. , 
The FCC is, in fact, moving toward the deregulation of television 
broadcasting. 16 Where this movement will eventually lead depends a 
great deal on the members of the Commission itself and the continued 
deregulatory climate in national politics. Television programming, 
however, is too significant a factor in the development of norms and 
values in society for the direction of its regulation to be determined by 
the sorely deficient arguments contained in this book. 
- Robert R. Morse, Jr. 
15. See, e.g., Geller, Communications Law -A Half Century Later, 37 FED. COM. L. REV. 
73 (1985); Jones & Quillan, Broadcasting Regulation: A Very Brief History, 37 FED. COM. L. 
REv. 107 (1985); Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry of Additional Television Networks: 
The Federal Communication Commission's Spectrum Management Policies, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 
875 (1981); Comment, A "Better" Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 36 FED. COM. 
L. REv. 27 (1984); Comment, Regulatory Approaches to Television Network Control of the Pro-
gram Procurement Process: An Historical Perspective, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 563 (1980); Note, A 
Regulatory Approach to Diversifying Commercial Television Entertainment, 89 YALE L.J. 694 
(1980). On the relationship between the FCC and the networks, see B. COLE & M. OETIINGER, 
RELUCTANT REGULATORS: THE FCC AND THE BROADCAST AUDIENCE (1978). 
16. Pp. 4-20; see Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 
TEXAS L. REV. 207 (1982). Coauthor Mark S. Fowler is Chairman of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission. 
